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Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the 
Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as 
a Regime of Labour Market Regulation 
HARRY ARTHURS* 
I THE CONTEXT 
New technologies, new patterns of consumption and production, new 
levels of intensity, magnitude, and volatility in the movement of people, 
information, and capital are transforming the global political economy. 
Many effects of this transformation become manifest in the domain of 
public policy, where parties across the political spectrum have embraced 
the nee-liberal agenda. That agenda has been characterized, perhaps 
hyperbolically, as the 'hollowing out of the state': facilitation of transna-
tional business activity; reduction of corporate and personal taxes and 
cuts in public expenditures, especially on social welfare; deregulation of 
domestic markets. These developments in turn are weakening, perhaps 
fatally, the labour market strategies and institutions of the p rior dispen-
sation, the post-war Keynesian welfare state: counter-cyclical job creation, 
collective bargaining, p rotective labour legislation, and equality-enhanc-
ing strategies.1 And most importantly, in the new global political econ-
omy, most states have come to feel that they cannot return to their former 
interventionist approaches to the labour market: either they suffer from a 
failure of will-they are afraid to alienate transnational corporations 
(TN Cs) and risk losing investment, revenues, and jobs; or they suffer from 
a failure of imagination-they cannot see how to regulate TNCs more 
* J should like to express my appreciation to the Social Science and Hwnanities Research 
Council of Canada for its financial support, to Angela Long and Matina Karvellas, my 
research assistants, for their diligent efforts, and to Carla Lipsig-Munune and Wes Cragg for 
their corrunents on an earlier draft. 
1 This argtiment does not address three important claims: (1) that in some respects-
immigration, social discipline, and facilitation of corporate activity-the state has become 
more aclive, not less; (2) that in the Jong term, neo-Hberal policies will generate a rising tide 
which will lift all boats (or sink aJI ships); (3) that in the short term, neo-liberalism has 
constrained, but·not fundamentally damaged, the social welfare state. None of these claims 
is h1consistent with the point made above-that public policy changes have put at risk famil-
iar labour market strategies and institutions. 
472 Harry Arthurs 
aggressively because so many key activities and actors lie beyond their 
juridical space. 2 
Needless to say, not all consequences of neo-Hberalism are felt in the 
domain of public policy. Some appear in very specific contexts, in 
communities and workplaces, in the lives of families and individuals. 
These can be summed up as a shift in power relations in favour of a 
limited group of corporate actors-TNCs, a privileged group of their 
business allies and partners, and a cosmopolitan elite of investors, exccu- , 
tives, professionals, technical experts, and consultants closely associated 
with their activities. By contrast, many workers, their unions and families, 
and local businesses, elites, and communities have suffered a loss of 
power, and sometimes (not always) of income and well being. 
But that is not quite the whole story. Transnational corporations may 
have promoted, and benefited from, neo-liberal policies; they may have 
enhanced their power vis-a-vis other actors; but they are not totally free to 
do as they please. States retain residual powers, both in theory and in 
reality; they can amend treaties, enact regulations, retract concessionary 
arrangements, and raise taxes if they are prepared to risk the conse-
quences. Thus, neo-liberal policies, though dominant, remain to a degree 
contestable. After all, even oligarchic governments-even TNCs, even 
neo-liberal economists-must know that they themselves are at risk in the 
long term if the promises of globalization remain unfulfilled, if important 
constituencies become disaffected, if societies are conflicted and disor-
derly. 
Hence the recent calls by some leading figures of world capitalism for 
more attention to honest and orderly markets, to equitable social and 
labour policies, to responsible environmental practices and to democratic 
politics.3 At least in the view of these leading figures, and of the corporate 
community they exemplify, citizens do retain some influence--albeit more 
potential than actual-as moral agents, voters, consumers, strikers, and 
rioters. If TNCs want workers to work in their factories, consumers to 
consume their goods, and governments to govern in their interest, they 
must appear to be 'responsible' in the way they treat workers, consumers, 
and communities. And by a happy coincidence, a modest body of research 
seems to suggest that they can be responsible and profitable too. There is 
money to be made in 'ethical investment' and 'sustainable development'; 
2 Stone, I<. V. W., 'Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches lo Transnational 
Labor Regulation' (1995) 16 Michigan /011rnal of International Law 987. 
3 See, e.g., Wollensohn, J. W., 'The Other Crisis' (Address to the World Bank Group, 6 
Oct. 1998) and A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framewol'k (Discussion Draft, 21 
Jan. 1999)- both located at www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf-text.htm; Schwab, K, and 
Smadja, C., 'Globalization Backlash is Serious', The Globe and Mail, 16 Feb. 1996, B10; Soros, 
G., The Crisis of Global Capitalism (New York: Public Affairs, 1998). 
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social market policies do not seem to impair the efficiency and adaptabil-
ity of workers;4 and economic prosperity may correlate positively with 
civic mindedness5 and progressive labour practices.6 
However, even if TNCs wish to consolidate their power and prof-
itability by projecting an image of responsible behaviour in labour 
markets and elsewhere, they confront a problem of p resentation and 
persuasion. Jn the previous dispensation, 'acting responsibly' was fairly 
easy to demonstrate-TNCs could say they were meeting their obliga-
tions under state labour law in their home country or host countries. No 
longer, not with state labour law confined by national boundaries and the 
extraterritoriality doctrine, rolled back by aggressive deregulation, enfee-
bled by the defunding of workplace inspectorates, dependent on the 
support of rump unions and workers terrified that their work wm be 
'outsourced' and their jobs moved 'offshore'. In such a context, state law 
is no longer plausible as benchmark for responsible corporate behaviour. 
In principle, TNCs, their advisors, and apologists might have solved 
the problem of a plausible benchmark by supporting the reinvigoration of 
state law, helping to build effective transnational institutions or entering 
into a new social contract with workers and communities. However, what 
they have chosen to do instead is to promulgate their own benchmark, 
their own self-imposed law: 'codes of conduct'. These codes typically 
commit TNCs to treating their workers fairly, and some contain compli-
ance procedures designed to give credibility to the project of self-regula-
tion. There is a double irony here. First, by projecting their labour codes 
into the transnational economic sphere, TNCs commit themselves to 
respecting freedom of association, due process, fair wages, and the 
dignity of their workers-norms which were embedded in the very 
systems of state law which TN Cs themselves were instrumental in under-
mining. Secondly, by adopting voluntary codes, TNCs have, in effect, 
engaged in the 'reproduction' of liberal legality in the transnational 
economic field, a strategy which in the field of socio-legal scholarship has 
an unlikely provenance-Santos' s description of the legal system created 
by the poor residents of a Brazilian favela.7 
However, irony should not be corifused with coincidence. The prolif-
eration of codes has not only proceeded in tandem with the most recent 
4 See, e.g., Blank, R. (ed.), Social Protection versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Trade-Off? 
(Chicago, ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1994). See also OECD, Employment Outlook (Paris: 
OECD, 1999) ch. 4. 
5 Putnam, R., Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: 
Pl'incP.ton UnivPrsity Pmc;s, 199::\). 
6 Sengenberger, W., and Campbell, D., The Role of l..abour Standards in Industrial 
Restructuring (Geneva: Institute for Labour Studies, 1994). 
7 De Sousa Santos, B., 'The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction 
of Legality in Pasagarda' (1977) 12 Law & Society Review 5. 
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wave of globaHzation; it seems to be causally related. During the 1970s, in 
response to a wave of third world, trade union, and economic nationalist 
complaints about rising foreign investment and increasing influence of 
foreign-based multinationals, various international agencies-as well as 
the International Chamber of Commerce-adopted mode] codes 
designed to promote good corporate citizenship,8 which in turn triggered 
a spate of academic writing at the end of the decade and into the 1980s.9 
However, in the 'new world economic order' of the 1980s-with labour in 
decline, developing countries increasingly dependent on TNC invest-
ment, and national political and economic elites reconciled to globali7.a-
tion-the initial international momentum which had produced these 
• 
codes dissipated. Nonetheless, a new momentum favouring codes devel-
oped during the 1980s, as human rights groups-and protest groups with 
quite varied agendas-sought to curtail TNC investment and business 
activity in apartheid-era South Africa, Northern Ireland, Soviet Russia, 
and the People's Republic of China;10 most of these codes subsided in due 
course, along with the controversies which provoked them. However, for 
reasons which will be explored below, codes have come back into fashion. 
A recent OECD document shows that since the early J990s, significant 
numbers of TNCs and their sectoral organizations have adopted codes, 
some 60 per cent of which deal wholly or partly with employment stan-
dards.11 !LO and UNCTAD reports have also remarked on the recent 
proliferation of TNC voluntary corporate codes-especially codes of 
8 International Chamber of Commerce, Guidelines for l11ternatio11al ]11vestme11t (Paris: ICC, 
1972); OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD, 1976); International 
Labour Office, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy (Geneva: ILO, 1977). A United Nations report recommended adoption of a draft code 
of conduct for MNEs in as early as 1974; however, it has never been formally ratified. 
9 Sec, e.g., Baade, l I., 'f11e Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for MNEs (Bielefeld: Centre for 
Interdisciplil1ary Research: University of Bielefeld, International Symposium on Legal 
Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 1979); Baker,]., and Ryans, J., 
'Mullinational Corporation Investment in Less Developed Com1tries: Reducing Risk' (1979) 
18 Nebrnskn journal of Econ. & Business 61; Gunter, H., 'The International Labour Office 
Declaration of Multinational Enterprises and the lntemational Code of Conduct Movement' 
(1981) 4 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative L. Journal 1; Note, 'Host State 
Treatment of Transnational Corporations: Formulation of a Standard for the United Nations 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations' (1983-4) 7 Fordham International L. Journql 
467; Horn, N . (ed.), Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises (Dev~nter: 
Kluwer, 1980). 
IO Fo~· a general review see Perez-Lopez,]., 'Promoting International Respect for Worker 
Rights through Business Codes of Conduct' (1993) 17 Fordham !Jlternatio11al L. foul'llal 1; 
Compa, L., and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere, T., 'Enforcing Labor Rights through Corporate 
Codes of Conduct' (1995) 33 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 663. 
11 The OECD study identified some 182 codes, promulgated by transnational bodies, by 
major TNCs, or by influential sectoral and stakeholder associalions. Of the codes whose 
dales of promulgation are given, the great rnajority came into force after 1995; virtually none 
was operative before 1990. Codes of Corporate Conduct, Working Party of the Trade 
Committee, Trade Directorate (Paris: OECD TD/TC/WP (98) 74 (Dec. 1998). 
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employment standards12-as have several government, NGO and schol-
arly studies.13 
Tl1e questions to be addressed in this chapter,· then, are why TNCs 
have 'volunteered' to subject themselves to ' codes at this particular 
moment, just when they are becoming increasingly immune from other 
constraints, whether these codes represent the successful 'reproduction of 
legality' and how states, workers, unions, and other actors are likely to be 
affected by them. 
1 WHY 'VOLUNTARY' EMPLOYMENT CODES? 
There is nothing new under the sun, certainly not codes governing 
employment in transnational enterprises. From the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries, the Crowley steel works-near Sunderland, in the 
north of England- was governed by a 'book of laws' (sometimes called 
the 'ancient constitution') which laid down the rights and obligations of 
workers in this huge paternalistic proto-global enterprise.14 The great 
global trading companies-the Hudson's Bay Company, the East India 
Company- became quasi-governments and promulgated legal codes 
which comprehensively regulated the behaviour of their employees (and 
other people) all over the world. Early Victorian manufacturers and mine 
owners-a formidable presence in Imperial and in terna tional trade-had 
statutory power to establish their own codes or 'special rules' dealing 
with safety and work practices.15 Codes-work rules and employment 
manuals, adopted unilaterally, and collective agreements, adopted bilat-
erally-have been a fixture of modern industrial employment. And even 
12 !LO, Overview of Global Developments (Working Party on the Socia l Dimensions of the 
Liberalization of Trade, Report to the International Labour Office, Nov. 1998) GB. 
273/WP /SDL/1 found at www.ilo.org.ch/ public/ english/20gb I docs/ gb273/ sdl-1.htin. 
See also United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCT AD), World 
Investment Report 1994-Transnational Corporations, Employment and t/ie Workplace (New 
York/Geneva: United Nations, 1994) 349 ff. 
13 See Perez-Lopez and Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere, above, n. 10; Culpepper, R., 
and Whiteman, G., 'The Corporate Stake in Social Responsibility' in Hibler, H., and 
Beamish, R (eds), Canadian Corporations and Social Responsibilihj (Ottawa: The North-Soulh 
Institute, 1998); and US Deparhnent of Labor, Bureau of lntemational Affairs, The Appnrel 
"'· Industry nnd Codes of Co11duct: A Solution to the In ternational Child Labor Problem? (Washington, 
DC: Department of Labor, '1996). 
"
4 The Crowleys owned the largest steel works in Tiurope, imported raw materials from 
Sweden, Spain, and Russia, and expol'tcd finished products to lndia, the colonies, and vari-
OllS European countries: Flinn, M. W., Men of Iron: The Crowleys in the Early Iron Industry 
(Edinburgh: The University Press, 1962). 
lS Arthurs, H. W., 'Without tlie Law': Administrative Justice nnd Legnl Plurnlism in Nineteenth 
Centun; England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) ch. 4. 
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thoroughly globalized, post-modern, post-industrial 'empowered' 
employees have continued to be ruled by employment codes.16 
All of these codes share two main characteristics. They operate in-
ternally, within the enterprise, to define terms of employment such as 
wages, working conditions, discipline, and quality standards; to educate 
workers to adhere to them; and to ensure orderly and consistent enforce-
ment of those terms by supervisors and managers. And they operate 
externally, by mimicking the rhetoric, forms, and processes of law, to 
convince conscientious investors, consumers, NGOs, and governments of 
the legitimacy of what are characteristically unequat and sometimes 
exploitative, employment relations.17 Indeed the ultimate legitimation 
strategy is to co-opt potential critics by enlisting them as sponsors of a 
code regime. Finally, some codes arc adopted on a sectoral or industry-
wide basis. Such codes give each signatory a stake in policing the others, 
diminish the risk that 'free riders' will benefit from goodwill accruing to 
the sector as a wJmle, and make it more difficult for non-complying firms 
to compete on the basis of their lower labour costs and standards.18 All of 
this contributes to the operational efficacy of the code, which in turn 
makes it a more convincing legitimating device. 
The internal functions of codes- their tutelary and discipl~nary func-
tions-have been dealt with elsewhere, by authors from E.P. Thompson19 
to Stuart Henry;20 the appearance of rival, even subversive, normative 
systems 'in the shadow' of these corporate codes has been documented by 
Burawoy;21 the reflexive, rule-generating tendency of large corporations 
has been addressed by Teubner and others;22 and I have attempted to 
situate all of these approaches to workplace codes within a general theory 
·
16 See, e.g., 'Workplace Ethics' (1986) 31/12 Management Solutions 12; Collett, P., 'Codes of 
Conduct: A Framework for Ethics' (1998) 68/1 Australian Accountant 29; Whitehead, M., 
'People Don't Seem to Know Right from Wrong' (1999) 5/3 People Management 14. See also 
Sewell, G., and Wilkinson, B., '"Someone to Watch Over Me": Smveillance, Discipline and 
the Just-in-Time Labour Process' (1992) 26 Sociology 271. 
17 Hepple, B., 'A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate 
Codes of Conduct' (paper presented at the W. G. Hart Workshop; London: Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, 1999). Hepple and I both use 'legitimation' in the sense of a calcu-
lated attempt to win acceptance for one's actions by appealing to shared values and beliefs. 
There is considerable controversy surrounding the term. See Hyde, A., 'The Concept of 
Lefliitimation in the Sociology of Law' (1983) Wisco11sin L. Review 379. 
See Purchase, D., 'The Political Economy of Voluntary Codes' (Industry Canada, 
u1'Eublished, 1997). 
Thompson, E. P., 'Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism' l:n his Customs in 
Commoi1 (New York: The New Press, 1991). 
20 Henry, S., 'Disciplinary Pluralism: Four Models of Private Justice in the Workplace' 
(1987) 35 Sociologicnl Review 279. 
21 Burawoy, M., Mnnufncturing Consent (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
22 Teubner, G., Global Law without the State (Aldershot/Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing, 
1997). 
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of legal and industrial pluralism.23 Their external functions- their legit-
imating and market regulating functions-are the focus of this chapter. 
Of course, there is no dear division between internal and external audi-
ences. For workers and consumers, managers, and government officials to 
be persuaded to accept voluntary codes as the equivalent of legal protec-
tions, all must acquiesce in roughly similar values and assumptions. 
Hence the importance of the dominant nee-liberal discourse which dispar-
ages state regulation and stresses the inevitability of globalization, the 
positive contributions of TNCs, and the invincible logic of their structures 
and policies. Moreover, codes must be perceived to achieve results 
roughly comparable to those achieved through alternative means such as 
statutory regulation or collective bargaining. If there is excessive disson-
ance between the reality of workplace life and the rhetoric of an employ-
ment code, workers will be disillusioned, the public will be disenchanted, 
TNCs will be publicly embarrassed, and self-regulation will cease to be 
regarded as legitimate. Hence the need to create 'legal' procedures that can 
both bring about and testify to the positive consequences of self-regula-
tion. What is puzzling about the recent proliferation of voluntary employ-
ment codes, however, is that their underlying values remain somewhat 
obscure, their procedures deeply flawed, and their outcomes unverified. 
Values first. Traditional hierarchy and reciprocal obligation may have 
seemed the natural order of things to several generations of Crowleys, 
their workers, and their latter-day counterparts in developing countries; 
the inexorable logic of market forces acting upon 'free' contracting parties 
(backed by occasional state coercion) may have been all that was needed 
to justify employment practices in the dark satanic mills of nineteenth-
century England; and the Wagner Act's promise that workers were to be 
given democratic voice and vote in their relations with their employer 
may have been, for a time, persuasive to enlightened employers, militant 
employees, and an American public concerned about escalating industrial 
warfare. But none of these seems to have much salience today. Procedures 
next. Only a minority of codes summarized in the OECD study-and in 
other studies-actually include any procedural arrangements at all, only 
a handful involve anything approaching independent monitoring, and 
virtually none involves third-party enforcement. And, finally, outcomes. 
To put it plainly, there is little or no evidence about how codes actually 
affect the behaviour of TNCs. Thus, it is something of a mystery why 
voluntary codes should have become so numerous in recent years. 
23 Arthurs, H. W., 'The Law of the Shop: The Debate over Industrial Plura)jsm' (1985) 38 
Current Legal Problems 83; Arthurs, H. W., 'Landscape and Memory: Labour, Law, Legal 
Pluralism and Globalization' in Wilthagen, T. (ed.), Advancing Theory iii Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in a Global Context (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Science, 1998), 21. 
r--
1 
l 
i 
I 
'i 
l 
I 
I 
l 
~ 
I 
I 
478 Harry Arthurs 
Several alternative hypotheses may be advanced. First, transnational 
corporations arc often said to depend upon their 'human capital' for 
success in a knowledge-based global economy. If they are to attract and 
retain the workers they need, enlightened self-interest dictates that they 
should both preach high employment standards-by adopting voluntary 
codes-and practise them. This hypothesis may indeed hold true for a 
privileged cadre of peripatetic executives, technical experts, and profes-
sionals. However, it does not seem to have much to do with millions of 
rank-and-file production workers1 who-if tre~ted as 'human capital' at 
all-seem to be regarded as low-yield and essentially disposable assets. 
Most of these workers are involved in the global economy only in the 
sense that what they make is ultimately marketed abroad, often under 
global trade marks; they themselves work in intensely localized labour 
markets, often in the third world or on the periphery of the advanced 
economies. Moreover, most of them are not privileged knowledge work-
ers; they generally perform routine manual work, under conditions that 
are often substandard and sometimes appalling. In any event, they all too 
seldom enjoy the wages and working conditions that are implicitly 
promised by corporate employment codes or the many international 
regimes which mandate them. 
A second hypothesis is that globalization has not only benefited jn-
vestors antj. other privileged elites, but that it has also strengthened the 
worldwide acceptance of human rights and worker entitlements. 
Voluntary codes, on this view, arc no less important a source of such rights 
and entitlements than international treaties and agreements or national 
legislation; indeed, they are proof that the appropriate norms have perco-
lated into and become operational in actual workplaces, where they count 
most. Again, there is modest evidence to support this hypothesis; but there 
is also considerable experience to the contrary. In the maquiladoras, the 
enterprise zones of the People's Republic of China, the carpet factories of 
Pakistan, or, for that matter, the manufacturing plants of southern Ontario 
or South Wales, expanded investment, employment opportunities, and 
markets are premised on government policies designed to establish a 
'business friendly' environment. These policies generally involve deroga-
tion from established worker rights and entitlements and, in extreme 
cases, forcible suppression of worker and community organizations. 
Nonetheless, it is relatively rare for businesses-the intended beneficiaries 
of these policies-to protest against repressive labotu legislation or strat-
egies, or to insist that they would prefer to apply the high standards set out 
in their voluntary codes, such as protection of the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. One must ask, therefore, whether a deep attachment 
to the notion of labour rights and entitlements is in fact what animates the. 
adoption of voluntary codes by transnational business. 
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The third hypothesis is, to me, the most persuasive. The interconnect-
edness of the global economy, some note, has made it vulnerable to 
disruption. Haw materials from one country are ·processed in another,. 
turned into manufactured parts in a third, integrated into finished prod-
ucts in a fourth, shipped to distributors in a fifth, and marketed around 
the world. Each stage in the production process, each border crossed, each 
market served, each part of the larger corporate empire is potentially a 
site where employment practices can be called into question. Stoppages 
by production workers, refusals to handle by transport workers, 
consumer boycotts, and political pressures in any one of a score of coun-
tries may have ramifying consequences. This is not to suggest that work-
ers, their unions, or transnational advocacy groups can mobilize support 
easily, that the legal systems of most countries tolerate such mobilization, 
or that transnationals lack ample power to defend themselves in most 
conflictual situations. Nonetheless, it is in the interests of transnational 
corporations to cosmeticize conflict, if they can, to pacify workers, 
neutralize unions, and reassure NGOs, governments, and consumers-all 
objectives that can be facilitated by adopting voluntary codes. This is the 
most obvious explanation of the recent popularity of 'voluntary codes' 
which are, in this perspective, not quite so voluntary as all that. 
II THE SUCCESSFUL REPRODUCTION OF LEGALITY? 
Voluntary codes may cover safe and healthy working conditions, griev-
ance procedures, collective bargaining, measures forbidding discrimina-
tion, child labour, or substandard wages. They may establish procedures 
for inspection, processing complaints, and resolving disputes. Thus, at a 
superficial glance, voluntary codes of employment may seem capable of 
reproducing-approximately, if not precisely-many of the substantive 
and procedural characteristics of state labour legislation. 
At a middle distance, however, the differences between state law and 
voluntary regimes become more apparent. Legislation applies to the 
generality of enterprises; codes only to those which have chosen to 
promulgate a code or make themselves subject to one. Unlike the rela-
tively precise and directory language of regulatory statutes, the language 
of most codes is vague, hortatory, and not well suited to compelling 
compliance in circumstances which are unclear or controversial. Virtually 
all statutes are enforced ultimately by the coercive agencies of the state; 
with rare exceptions, no coercive power is available to enforce voluntary 
codes. And, in principle, those charged with violating state labour stan-
dards are judged by a court or independent regulatory tribunal; those 
charged with violating codes are generally judged by themselves or their 
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nominees. Codes, then, are at best only a rough approximation of liberal 
legality, not a strict replication of it. 
But on close examination, the picture is not quite so clear. In effect, we 
have been comparing an ideal model of legislation and state regulation 
with the current, flawed reality of self-regulation. If we revisit each of the 
points just made, we will see that voluntary codes bear a closer resem-
blance to state regimes than we may care to admit. 
Because of constitutional limitations, political influence, and material-
ity thresholds, the coverage of state regulatory regimes in practice is less 
than universal,24 and sometimes no more comprehensive than that of 
voluntary regimes administering codes adopted by sectoral or stake-
holder organizations. Statutory language-especially in labour statutes-
may appear clear, but even longstanding interpretations can be frustrated 
by lengthy challenges or overturned by unsympathetic courts; in both 
state and self-regulating systems, corporations tend to have the last word. 
While, in principle, the state's coercive power can be mobilized to secure 
compliance with labour laws, this seldom takes place in practice. 
Recently, many states have abandoned aggressive and costly inspection 
and enforcement programmes in favour of self-reporting and self-
discipline by employers, and formal adjudication and punitive action in 
favour of alternative dispute resolution. State enforcement systems, in 
practice, have often become no more rigorous than those established 
under voluntary codes. Even independent adjudication-which suppos-
edly guarantees the integrity of state regulatory practice, and which has 
no counterpart under voluntary schemes-does not operate as cleanly 
and decisively as it is supposed to. Even in their golden age, state regula-
tors were susceptible to 'regulatory capture' / the outcome of symbiotic 
association with their 'clientele', of lobbying and patronage, of inadequate 
resources. Judges, by contrast, remained independent and were never 
'captured'; but they did not need to be: they seldom demonstrated much 
sympathy for workers' interests, or much understanding of their organi-
7.ations and strategies. 
Ironically, then, given that state regulation of the workplace is in disre-
pair and disrepute, voluntary corporate regimes may not produce such 
very different outcomes. And now a further irony: intentionally or unin-
tentionally, voluntary regimes sometimes become entangled with state 
policy-making and state legality instead of merely providing an alterna-
tive to the one and a facsimile of the other. 
24 E.g., a recent study estimates that 33% of all private-sector workers and 25% of all 
women workers are excluded from coverage of the US National Labor Relations Act: 
Cobble, D. S., 'Making Postindustrial Unionism Possible' in Friedman, S. (ed.), Restoring the 
Promise of American Labor Law (Ithica, NY: Cornell ILR Press, 1994) 285. 
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1ll VOLUNTARY CODES AND THE STATE 
If, as hypothesized, voluntary code regimes are evidence of the immunity 
of TNCs from state regulation, it must also be said that states themselves 
actively or passively promote the adoption of such codes and even 
become directly involved in drafting and administering them. 
Governments formulating labour market policies have always 
conducted an ongoing process of implicit-even explicit-negotiation 
with advisory bodies, industry representatives, major corporations, 
unions, NGOs, and other stakeholder groups. In recent times, however, 
the focus of negotiations has shifted as a result of the desire of neo-liberal 
governments to win the approval of investors and maintain the confi-
dence of financial markets especially for their macro-economic policies.25 
In the result, public policies affecting the labour market have arguably 
become even more negotiable than they were during the hey-day of 
corporatism.26 However, negotiations now virtually exclude the labour 
movement, although macro-economic policies shape the labour market 
and in turn appear to play 'a major role in shaping the trajectory of 
employer strategies and employment relations' .27 
How does this new dynamic of policy negotiation lead to the adoption 
of voluntary codes? Employers in general have been emboldened by their 
dominant position in the policy process and the labour market, and by 
widespread acknowledgement of their need to resort to domestic or 
offshore labour practices which will enable them to respond to global 
competition. Consequently, some of them may choose-or, from their 
perspective, be driven-to engage in egregious, irresponsible, and 
exploitative practices: the use of child labour, brutal repression of a strike, 
a fatal failure to adhere to safety standards. The consequences of such 
practices are then publicized by a union or social advocacy group, widely 
reported by the media, and used as the rallying cry for a boycott of the 
company's goods or a campaign for legislation designed to suppress the 
practice and exclude the offending goods from market. Governments, 
confronted with public demands that they 'do something', often respond 
by asking the employer in question to promise to behave in the future, a 
2s Castles, F., 'The Dynamics of Policy Change: What Happened to the English-speaking 
Nations in the 1980s' (1990) 18 European Journal of Political Research 491. 
26 See Fogleson, R., and Wolfe, J. (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment: Plumlism, 
Corporatism and Privatiz.ation (New York/Westport/London: Greenwood Press, 1989); 
Crouch, C., and Dore, R. (eds.), Corporatism and Accountability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990). 
27 Goddard, J., 'Managerial Strategies, Labour and Employment Relations and the State: 
the Canadian Case and Beyond' (1997) 35 BJIR 399. 
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promise which is likely to be expressed in the form of a voluntary 
code.28 
Voluntary codes for employers are obviously attractive for employers: 
no legal controls or sanctions, lower compliance costs (or none), and good 
publicity eclipsing bad. And codes are attractive for governments: they 
permit them to be seen to be concerned and responsive without provok-
ing negative reactions from investors, breaking current ideological taboos 
against regulation, or incurring the transaction costs associated with 
inspection, prosecution, and other traditional forms of intervention. 
Moreover, voluntary codes may actually resolve problems, or at least alle-
viate them to the poh1t where they cease to be a political issue. And of 
course, if they do not-if codes fai l to produce the desired practical or . 
political outcomes, if, in the end, conventional regulation is unavoid-
able-governments will at least be able to say to employers, investors, 
and ideological critics that it was the last resort, not the first. 
Parenthetically, in some federal states, code~ have the additional attrac-
tion of offering a way around potential jurisdictional conflicts over who 
can regulate what.29 
When legislation is ultimately enacted-with or without the acquies-
cence of important constituencies-negotiation does not cease. It contin-
ues on a daily basis in the context of administration and enforcement. 
This crucially important element of 'negotiation' results from the fact that 
the state's resources-its juridical powers, personnel, and political credi-
b ility-are seldom sufficient to support inspection of every workplace, 
prosecution of every offending employer, or proscription of every new 
hazardous process or practice. Consequently, from the earliest Victorian 
labour legislation30 to the present,31 governments have sought to enhance 
compliance and lighten the burdens of administration by persuading or 
compelling ernployers to take 'ownership' of labour legis.lation, to inter-
28 As these words are written, publicity is being given to the settlement of a class action 
againsl US garment retailers on behalf of 50,000 Asian garment workers on Saipan, a US 
Pacific territory. The workers, who alleged that they were kept in a form of peonage, 
conlrary to US and international human rights law, agreed to accept the introduction of an 
employment code, monitored by Verite, an independent monitoring agency with atypically 
slrong complaint and remedial procedures tmder the joint supervision of the retailers 
and human rights and labour organizations. See Sweatshop Watch, website at 
hl~: I /www.igc.org/ swatch/Marianas/ settlement.html. 
Canada may be an extreme case, because constitutional interpretations have assigned 
employee-employer relations to provincial control, despite the fact that, in general, 
provinces cannot effectively deal with corporations which conduct operations outside their 
bow1daries or abroad. But even in states with more appropriate constitutional arrange-
ments, conflicting local and national interests and values may well make the enactment of 
nalional legislation politically awkward. 
30 Arthurs, above, n. 15, chs. 4 and 5. 
3l Levine, D., 'Reinventing Workplace Regulation' (1997) 39 California Management 
Review 98. 
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nalize its values so that they are routinely translated into workplace 
norms, without the need for government inspection, admonition, or pros-
ecution. Codes appear to be a promising strategy for enhancing compli-
ance: they are written by employers, administered by employers, andr 
hopefully, internalized in the operating procedures of employers. 
Nowhere is the challenge of securing compliance more difficult than in 
the case of the offshore operations of domestic employers, investors, or 
traders. Here, the inspector's writ does not legally run; here, practices are 
likely to be most egregious; here, workers see confi rmation of their worst 
fears of a 'race to the bottom' .32 Codes once again may provide the 
answer. Firms which adopt and adhere to codes in their foreign opera-
tions effectively relieve their own governments of the legal, practical, and 
political challenges of extraterritorial inspection and enforcement. 
Various privileges-participation in trade missions, export loan guaran-
tees, access to government purchasing programmes-can be extended to 
firms which are code-compliant, and denied to those which are not. And, 
finally, if these privileges do not suffice to shield compliant employers 
from competition by non-compliant firms w ith lower labour costs, codes 
can be used as the template for legislation or regulations designed to bar 
'rogue' firms from domestic markets. For all of these reasons, states have 
pursued an active policy of promoting code regimes for locally-based 
corporations trading abroad through technical initiatives, mediation 
amongst stakeholders, and public endorsement of specific high profile 
code initiatives,33 as well as through direct or symbolic commitment as 
code signatories.34 
:i:>. Langille, B., 'General Reflections on the Relationship of Trade and Labour (or Pair 
Trade is Free Trade's Destiny)' in Bhagwati, J., and Hudec, R E. (eds.), Fair Trade and 
Harmonizntion (Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press, 1996) 231. 
33 The Canadian government has been particularly active in this regard. It has commis-
sioned a series of research studies which were presented to a major stakeholders' conference 
on 'Exploring Voluntary Codes in the Marketplace' (Sept. 1996), issued an exlensive 
report-Standards Systems: A Guide for Canadian Reg11lntors (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 
1998)-and worked with stakeholders to develop a users' guide-Volu11tan1 Codes: A Guide 
to their Development and Use (Ottawa: Industry Canada/Treasury Board, 1998). It has also 
maintained an ongoing Voluntary Codes Project with an activist Director (Kernaghan Webb, 
webb.kernaghan@ic.gc.ca) and a website (http://www/stratcgis.ic.gc.ca/vokodes). 
FinaUy, it has helped or is helping to promote the use of volunta1y codes, especially by 
Canadian-based firms doing business abroad. See, e.g., Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative funded by Human Resources Development Canada in co-operation with the 
Conference Board of Canada, described in Khoury, G., Rostami, J., and Turnbull, P., 
Col'porate Social Responsibility: Turning Words into Action (Ottawa: Conference Board of 
Canada, 1999); Intemational C.ocie of Ethics for Canadian Businesses, described in 
CL~epper and Whiteman, above, n. 13. 
E.g., President Clinton presided over the signing at the White House of the much-heralded 
Apparel Industry Partnership Code (14 Apr. 1997), New York Times, Sec A, 17. The AlP Code 
has since been denounced by its muon and church signatories: see below, text at n. 45. 
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Finally, voluntary codes of labour standards may, paradoxically, give 
rise to explicit consequences in domestic and in ternational law.35 There is 
little litigation so far involving codes, especiaJly in the labour area, and 
what follows is largely conjectural. However, in principle it seems possi-
ble that codes may, in given circumstances, materially affect the outcome 
of litigation. For example, codes which originate in agreements within 
sectoral organizations or amongst stakeholder groups may constitute 
legally binding contracts. Governments may make compliance with 
employment codes a formal condition of tendering and performance in 
procurement contracts, or in order to gain access to markets.36 And codes 
may be used by judges to pour substantive content into vague normative 
standards-'implied' terms on which to ground an unlawful dismissal 
suit, a standard of 'reasonableness' to define the duty of care owed to 
injured workers, evidence of what constitutes 'due di1igence' by corpo-
rate directors who are sued for failing to prevent workplace harassment. 
Thus, state regulation and voluntary code regimes are not mutually 
exclusive alternatives, nor do voluntary code regimes simply reproduce 
systems of state regulation. To some extent the two systems exist in a state 
of symbiosis, and are more simHar in their strategies and outcomes, more 
ideologically a ligned, more mutually dependent and operationally 
integrated than is generally believed-but only to some extent. State 
regulation and self-regulation are neither interchangeable nor-
ultimately-compatible systems. Self-regulation represents an assertion 
by corporations that they should be allowed to decide for themselves to 
what extent their interests will take priority over the claims of workers, 
communities, and states-an assertion which has gained both popularity 
and credibility in a period of globalization and neo-liberal politics. State 
regulation, by contrast, rests on a more democratic paradigm of gover-
nance. It proceeds from the premise that communities and states must be 
able to respond politically, lega1ly, and practically through enforceable 
legislation to moral condemnation of the egregious failures of corporate 
self-regulation. However, moral condemnation tends to be muted in these 
days of neo-liberalism, and the practical effects of state regulation 
constrained by globalization and other powerful forces. So self-regulation 
35 See generally Webb, K, 'Voluntary Initiatives and the Law' in Gibson, R. (ed.), Voluntary 
Initiatives: The New Politics of Corporate Greening (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1999), 
32; Webb, K., and Morrison, A, 'Voluntary Approaches, the Environment and the Law: A 
Canadian Perspective' in Carraro, C., and Leveque, F. (eds.), VoluntnnJ Approaches in 
E11viro11111e11tnl Policy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 229; Horn, N. (ed.), Legal 
Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises (Deventer: Kluwer, 1980). 
36 However, this form of 'regulation by contract' exposes governments to the risk of being 
accused of violating international trade rules which ban non-tariff barriers and uncompen-
sated regulatory 'takings', or of exceeding their powers as defined by domestic legislation 
or constitutional provisions. · 
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and state regulation coexist-with states generally accepting that self-
regulation is better than nothing, and corporations acknowledging that 
they had better at least be seen to regulate their workplaces with some 
rigour, rather than allow grievances to fester, worker militancy to grow/ 
and pressures to build for the return of the interventionist state. 
IV VOLUNTARY CODES AND NON-STATE ACTORS 
A new 'discursive community' has grown up in and around the 'code 
industry'. It includes scholars, consultants, dispute resolvers, ombudsper-
sons, and independent monitors who constitute a kind of civil service for 
code regimes; norm-setting and monitoring bodies such as the 
International Standards Organization, the Ethical Trading Initiative, 
Verite, and the Council on Economic Priorities which promulgate or moni-
tor global labour standards; and-proof positive of the growing market for 
voluntary regulation-the global accounting and consulting firms which 
now offer 'independent' auditing services to verify code compliance. By 
shaping the emerging architecture of codes and code compliance strate-
gies, by defining the interaction between codes and state law and policy, 
by mediating amongst the parties implicated in specific code regimes, the 
participants in this discursive community establish the conceptual reper-
toire and professional discourse of self-regulation. In this sense, they play 
a central role in determining the success or failure of the project of legiti-
mation which- in my view-lies at the heart of the emergence of volun-
tary codes at this particular juncture in the globalization process. 
However, legitimation is not simply produced; it must be consumed as 
well. This may be the source of some difficulty, as corporations, govern-
ments, and members of the 'voluntary code community' may see things 
quite differently from workers who experience the employment practices 
of TNCs, or the unions, social movements, and advocacy groups which 
seek to alter those practices. In the former group, there seems to be a 
degree of optimism about volur1tary codes. As a recent Canadian govern-
ment report suggests: 
Voluntary codes represent an innovative approach to addressing the concerns and 
needs of consumers, workers and citizens while at the same tim.e helping 
Canadian companies to be more competitive .... A supplement and, in some 
circumstances, an alternative to traditional regulatory approaches, voluntary 
codes can be inexpensive, effective and flexible market instruments.37 
37 Jnb·oduction by Hon. J. Manley, Minister of Industry, and Hon. M. Masse, President of 
the Treasury Board, Voluntary Codes- A Guide for their Development n11d Use (Ottawa: 
Indushy Canada/Treasury Board, 1998). 
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This optimism, also expressed by knowledgeable academic observers,38 
human rights activists,39 and corporate leaders,40 is to some extent 
supported by surveys of corporate practice.41 However, there is also 
evidence that some firms are reluctant to adopt codes because of concerns 
about compliance costs and legal consequences as well as reputational 
risks stemming from overheated public expectations.42 And, more impor-
tantly, many firms that have adopted codes are not actually implement-
ing them.43 
For workers and unions, compliance is, of ~ourse, the crucial issue. 
This is true in two senses. They are anxious to ensure that independent, 
accountable, and effective agents administer codes; and they want to see 
evidence that codes are actually producing positive outcomes for workers 
who are supposed to benefit from them. It is precisely on the issue of 
compliance that one of the most widely heralded transnational code 
initiatives-the Apparel Industry Partnership44- has recently run into 
difficulty. Labour, church, and hllinan rights groups abandoned the AIP, 
protesting that corporate members had refused to agree to effective 
enforcement machinery or to guarantee their employees a 'living wage', 
and that ' the ATP code could do more harm than good, because it would 
give corporations a "fig leaf" to cover up their exploitation of workers 
abroad'.45 
This judgement may be wrong-headed or simply premature. As some 
commentators have argued, a second and third generation of codes may 
overcome the defects of the first,46 and each partial victory in the struggle 
against exploitation ultimately contributes to a more effective regime of 
transnational labour standards.47 However, that effective regime may be 
a Jong time coming. In the global economy, there is no obvious way to 
38 Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere, above, n. 10. 
39 Forccsc, C., Commerce with Conscience? Ruman Rights and Corporate Codes of Conduct and 
Putting Commerce into Conduct (Montreal: International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development, 1997). 
40 See, e.g., Haas, R. D., CEO of Levi Strauss, quoted in US Labor Department, above, 
n. 13, 14, n. 19. 
41 Lindsay, R. M., Lindsay, L. M., and Bruce, V., 'Instilling Ethical Behaviour in 
Oraanizations: A Survey of Canadian Companies' (1996) ] 5 Journal of Business Ethics 393. 
4 Cottrill, K., 'Global Codes of Conduct' (1996) 17 four11al of Business StrntegiJ 55. 
43 Lindsay el al., above, n. 41. 
44 Codes of Conduct in the US Apparel Industry, above, n. 13. 
45 Stephens, M., 'Code Name: Cover-Up' (Winter 1999) UNTTE Magazine, 
http:/ /www.uniteunion.org/magazine/win99/pvh.html. I~ appears that the resignation 
was actually triggered by the closure of the only unionized plant in Guatemala by one of the 
ATP corporate members. 
46 Compa and Hinchcliffe-Darricarrere, above, n. 10. 
47 Trubek, D., Mosher, J., and Rothstein, J., Trans11ationnlis111 i11 the Reg11fatio11 of Labor 
Relations: I11ternntional Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks (Madison, Wis.: 
International Institute, University of Wisconsin-Madiso11, 1999). 
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force corporations to adhere to their own voluntary codes. Not through 
law: there is so far no transnational proxy for the state with a monopoly 
over coercive action. Not through concerted labour action: unions seldom 
collaborate across boundaries, and remain divided· along fault lines of 
national origin, interest, ideology, history, and legal norms.48 Not 
through consumer boycotts: citizens concerned about labour standards 
may be persuaded from time to exercise their rights in the 'global market 
for citizenship'49 to protest the exploitation of workers at home or abroad, 
but they lack economic power, legal recourse, and the institutional means 
to sustain such initiatives. 
In such a context, one might argue, half a voluntary code is better than 
no regulation. But while this argument may have merit, it does not 
address a further concern of labour, human rights advocates, and social 
movements: that to acknowledge the potential of corporate good inten-
tions and to accept employer self-regulation even as a transitional 
measure is to legitimate the existing global economic system and its ulti-
mately unpalatable manifestations in workplaces and communities 
around the world. 
V CONCLUSION 
So we return to the issue of legitimacy. Voluntary codes arc emerging as 
the most significant feature of a fragile, inchoate regime of transnational 
labour market regulation. Employers are supposed to be the object of that 
regulation, but they are also its primary authors and administrators; they 
can conjure it up or make it disappear pretty much whenever and for 
whatever reason they wish. But workers-supposedly the subjects, the 
beneficiaries, of this regulation-lack the power to create it, significantly 
to influence its terms, or even to insist that they receive its promised bene-
fits; they can only denounce it and try to rob it of its legitimacy. We must 
somehow square this circle. 
4s See, e.g., Haworth, N., and Ramsay, H., 'Matching the Multinationals: Obstacles to 
International Trade Unionfam' (1986) 6 lnt'l. Journal of Sociologt; and Social Polici; 55; Bediner, 
B., Internatio11nl Labour Affairs- The World Trade Unions and the Multinntional Companies 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); but for a more optimistic view see Wind muller, J ., 'The 
International Trade Union Movement' in Blanpain, R. (ed.), Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations in Industrialized Market Economies (4th revd. edn, Deventer: Kluwer, 1990). 
49 Downes, D., and Janda, R., 'Virtual Citizenship' (1998) 13 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society 27; and see Schneidennan, D., 'Constitutionalizing the Culture-Ideology of 
Consumerism' (1998) 7 Social & Le~al Studies 213. 
